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DEATH AND TAXES-I
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF DEVOLUTION DOC-
TRINES WITH FEDERAL INCOME AND ESTATE
TAX IN DETERMINING RESPONSIBILITIES OF A
DECEDENT, HIS ESTATE AND HIS
SUCCESSORS
A Study of Interrelated Federal
Tax Theories and Their Predicates
in Legal History and Doctrine
R. T. BOEHM*
"Tax law is not a separate, water-tight compartment. It
is only a part of the general fabric of the law."
ARcH M. CANTRLL**
There is need to "eradicate the factual disconnection of
subjects. There is only one subject for education and that
is life in all its manifestations."
ALFRED NORTH WHITEIHEAD * '*
INTRODUCTION
"Taxation is eminently practical and is in fact brought to every
man's door."' In everyday practice the federal estate, gift and in-
come taxes are brought to the doorstep by practical impositions upon
a widely sweeping variety of legal rights. After the special circum-
stance of death, there follow other complicating factors. Death itself
approximates the taxable event for estate tax purposes, since it trig-
gers many of the devolution devices.2 It complicates even more the
* Partner, Boehm & Rance, Attorneys at Law, Columbus, Ohio; Lecturer in Law,
College of Law, The Ohio State University.
** Arch M. Cantrall, formerly Chief Counsel Internal Revenue Service; "The Activities
of the Office of the Chief Counsel," 36 Taxes 853, 856 (1958).
*** Alfred North Whitehead, 1861-1947, long-time professor on two continents, The
Aims of Education 10 (1932).
1 Mr. Justice Peckham, deciding Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 519, 3 Am. Fed.
Tax R. 2661 (1899); the same notion was repeated by Mr. Justice McReynolds in
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minn., 280 U.S. 204, 8 Am. Fed. Tax R. 10257 (1930),
by Mr. justice Sutherland in Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503, 8 Am. Fed. Tax
R. 10912, 10915 (1930), and by Mr. Justice Black in United States v. Jacobs, 306
U.S. 363, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R. 282, 39-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9336 (1939).
2 The Supreme Court early held that the federal estate tax falls not on the property
itself but is an excise tax which falls on the privilege of transmission to others. Knowlton
v. Moore, 174 U.S. 41, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2684 (1900); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U.S. 345, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R. 3110 (1921).
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income tax pattern because of the additional intermixture of more
time, additional taxable persons, varying rates and divergent devices
of devolution.
In the nature of things, the rights to untaxed income owned at
death must be specially treated to adjust for the fact of death, either
to avoid a loophole by which successors altogether escape the income
tax,3 or conversely to avoid a method as a result of which they might
be required to pay more merely because of it.4 But the fact of suc-
cession is also involved; at the instant of death, if all the income
rights of a decedent had been successfully realized, if all his de-
ductibles had been paid in fact and had been returned for taxation
up to his death, and if the resulting income tax liabilities had been
satisfied, the decedent's estate would still be liable for a succession
tax upon the net value of the assets remaining in hand. To assume
this unrealistically comprehensive settlement highlights the obvious;
the fact and timing of death are hardly more considerate and con-
venient to the tax collector than to others. Lacking an overall com-
position up to death, some successor must assemble the information,
marshall the assets, satisfy the creditors and pay the taxes.
A SURVEY OF THE BACKGROUND OF STATE PROPERTY DEVOLUTION
DOCTRINES WHICH AFFECT FEDERAL INCOME AND ESTATE TAx
RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING DEATH
Overgeneralizing, 5 it can be said that the determination of fed-
eral income tax liabilities tends to hinge primarily on federal con-
cepts,6 but not always.7 By contrast, federal estate tax liability falls
3 For example see Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. CI. 241, 6 Am. Fed. Tax R. 6592
(1927) in which ante-mortem uncollected income rights which were includible in an
estate as corpus were not taxable as income when collected prior to 1934.
4 The bunching problem and the present statutory solution were discussed in Comm'r
v. Linde, 213 F.2d 15, 45 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1522, 1526, 54-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9384 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
5 The scope and accuracy of, and the sweep of extensive exceptions to these grand
summaries require separate inquiries of major proportions. 10 Mertens, Law of Federal
Income Taxation § 61 (1958); 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Gift & Estate Taxation § 10
(1959); Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income Estate & Gift Taxation § 71.08 (1951).
6 Among many other, consider Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 21 Am. Fed. Tax R.
986, 38-2 U.S.T.C. 1[ 9602 (1938) holding that state law defining incomes and inheritances
is not controlling in determining federal statutory exemption of inheritance from the
income tax.
7 Occasionally federal law will import state legal doctrine to determine federal in-
come tax consequences. Thus, for example, it has been held that state law defines
payment unler the meaning of the statute which requires payment within two and one-
half months by certain corporations to related persons under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, § 267. Lincoln Storage Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 337, 40 Am. Fed.
Tax R. 691, 50-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9394 (3d Cir. 1951) (under New Jersey law); accord
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principally on rights which mostly are based on state law' without
regard to who succeeds to the property values. Devolution devices
determine the choice of the ultimate taxable person on whom falls
the income tax traceable to the decedent or his property.
Devolution technique potentially has two major functions: (1) it
may be concerned with the payment of the debts of the decedent as
a precedent condition followed by (2) distribution of the remaining
property of the decedent to his successors. These two fundamentals
do not necessarily coexist.9 There has grown up in the jurisprudence
of most American states a trichotomy of methods and attitudes
which are summarized and overly simplified at table 1, infra.
These three governing doctrines are the remnant of three di-
vergent legal histories each of which have had direct relevance in
fashioning modern property devolution methods:
1. Modern Probate Administration: Modern probate admin-
istration arose out of the deep penetration of the medieval church into
the temporal affairs of the English people. Before the Reformation,
the church was an arm of government. As far back as Norman times,
ecclesiastical courts considered themselves charged with the duty to act
pro salute anima, for the good of the soul of the decedent.' ° To protect
the decedent's post-mortem conscience it was necessary that his unpaid
debts be satisfied. This finished, the church supervised the distribu-
tion of personal property to sucessors. x In a later era after the Ref-
Barneby Cheney Engineering Co., 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 683, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
655 (1954) (under Ohio law).
8 Compare Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78, 80, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1046, 40-1
U.S.T.C. ff 9210 (1940); Johnson v. Helvering, 141 F.2d 208, 210, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.
280, 44-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944); and notice
Richardson v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 394, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5642, 59-2 U.S.T.C.
ff 9712 (E.D. Mich. 1959) (app. to 6th Cir. 1960) particularly urging as a ground of
error the applied contrast between state and federal law.
0 Recognizing the twin probate duty to first pay debts, then to distribute to suc-
cessors, modem decisions have permitted extra-judicial distribution in the form of
contractual family settlements where creditors were not directly damaged. 21 Am. Jur.
"Executors and Administrators" § 21 (1958); Annot., 54 A.L.R. 976 (1928); see Irt re
Estate of Christian, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 367 (Ct. App. 1940).
10 See Holdsworth, infra note 11.
11 "The ecclesiastical courts obtained jurisdiction over grants of Probate (sic) and
Administration (sic) and to a certain degree, over the conduct of the executor and
administrator. All these branches of their jurisdiction could be exercised only over per-
sonal estate: and this abandonment of jurisdiction to the ecclesiastical courts has tended,
more than any other single cause to accentuate the difference between real and personal
property. Even when the ecclesiastical courts had ceased to exercise some parts of this
jurisdiction, the law which they had created was exercised by their successors. .. "
Holdsworth, "The Ecclesiastical Courts and Their jurisdiction," in The History of English
Law 301, 302-11 (1903).
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DEATH AND TAXES-I
ormation, the jurisdiction was partially shared with the chancery
courts 2 and was finally transferred exclusively to the English Court
of Probate after 1857.1 American law follows these inherited practices.
2. The Special Character and Quality of Modern Real Estate
Law: This development resulted from the feudal system which
brought with it the money and troop-raising obligations imposed on
large English landowners after the Norman conquest in 1066. Wil-
liam's successors evolved the holder's responsibility as a handy way
to raise money and to provide armies for warfare.14 Perhaps it is
this background which lives on in our current practice to refer to
both taxes and soldiers as "levies." To keep responsibility concen-
trated, the right to convey land was limited in the early periods of
English law.' The tenacious rule of primogeniture was one familiar
by-product.'" Severe limitations on the right to seize land for the
payment of the debts of a decedent were another congruent result.'7
The enforcement of the law of real estate was within the exclusive
control of the law courts; to serve these policies, the judges evolved
their own independent doctrine.'8 Thus the concentration of the
right of descent to the exclusion of the claims of creditors was
one fundamental application; the rights of creditors were necessarily
held to be subordinate or non-existent." A corrollary standard is still
very much intact in modern law: real estate descends directly to the
12 Kiralfy, Potter's Historical Introduction to English Law & Its Institutions 593
(1958).
13 The probate function in England was exercised by both the ecclesiastical and the
chancery courts from about the time of the Restoration in 1660 until 1857. The ec-
clesiastical jurisdiction bad been abolished in 1640 by the Cromwellian legislature only
to be reconstituted in 1641. Kiralfy, op. cit. supra note 12 at 220, 221. See also 21 Am.
Jur. "Executors & Administrators" § 23 (1958).
14 Kiralfy, op. cit. supra note 12 at 31, 481, 488, 557, 593; Kinnane, Anglo American
Law 249-51 (2d ed. 1932).
15 Kiralfy, op. cit. supra note 12, at 562; Walsh, A History of Anglo American Law
52 (2d ed. 1932).
16 Primogeniture seems to have been dominant if not absolute during much of
English legal history until its effective statutory abolition in 1926 by Law of Property
Act of 1925, § 201(2). Kiralfy, op. cit. supra note 12 at 557, 560 and 562 passim; Walsh,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 284; Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 497-
500 (4th ed. 1948).
17 "[Fleudal principles were opposed to making land liable to seizure for the debts
of its owner. . . ." Not until 1807 in England could land be held for ordinary debt
obligations of a deceased owner. Jenks, Short History of English Law 36, 37, 250 (2d
rev. ed. 1922); 22 Ohio Jur. 2d "Executors & Administrators" § 144 (1956).
18 Kiralfy, op. cit. supra note 12, at 219, 220, 553, 562, 593 passint; Kinnane, op.
cit. supra note 14, at 275.
19 See Jenks, op. cit. supra note 17.
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heirs2° with the result that the general authority of the probate ad-
ministrator over real estate is limited to only a few circumstances.2'
For these historically significant reasons, real property and personalty
were treated differently by two differing and coexistent systems of
English law which divergently viewed whether there was a duty to
pay creditors 22 or whether the rights of successors were overriding.
23
3. Contractual succession arrangements: These arrangements
characterize a broad variety of rights which seem to be comparatively
more modern in origin. Succession outside of the probate pattern
and beyond the control of the probate courts is provided for as a
result of an actively expressed present intent of the owner24 found in
an inter vivos agreement for the post-mortem benefit of successors.
These agreements behave like and resemble familiar third party
benefits based upon old applications of the law of contracts. 25 Among
a host of examples of non-probate successions based upon lifetime
arrangements, the following familiar instances might be suggested:
20 An executor or an administrator does not take title to a decedents realty, but the
title is vested in the heirs or devisees, nor do they derive title through him. 21 Am.
Jur. "Executors & Administrators" § 285 (1958); 33 C.J.S. "Executors & Adminis-
trators" § 252 (1942) ; 22 Ohio Jur. 2d "Executors & Administrators" §§ 144, 394 (1956);
see also Kiralfy, op. cit. supra note 12, at 556.
21 Of course, the decedent may effectively grant authority by will to the executor
to treat the realty as a part of the estate, 33 C.J.S. "Executors & Administrators" § 252
(1942), or the authority may be conferred by statute so as to be approximately the
same as the grant as to personalty. Ohio Rev. Code § 2113.311 (1958) allows the estate
to control real estate for management in limited circumstances.
22 Contrast the common law protection of landowners against creditors, supra note
17, with the ecclesiastical doctrine requiring the payment of debts out of personalty in
what is now a probate situation; see text at supra note 10.
23 During the Middle Ages, intestacy was rare because this condition was viewed as
a moral deficiency since the decedent was thought to have probably rejected the last
ministrations of the church. Kiralfy, op. cit. supra note 12, at 562; Plucknett, op. cit.
supra note 16, at 689. An administrator was considered the delegate of the bishop, but
the executor was not. Kiralfy, op. cit. supra note 12, at 554, 561.
24 The intent test has been verbalized as precedent ever since early in the emergence
of the doctrine in Ohio. Comm'r v. Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 361, 166 N.E. 352 (1929);
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926).
25 Ohio has adopted the so-called contract theory as distinguished from the gift or
trust theory. Rhorbacker v. Citizens Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 138 Ohio St. 273, 34 N.E.2d
751 (1941), noted in 8 Ohio St. L.J. 124 (1941). The contract idea when combined with
a debtor-creditor relationship in which title passes to an obligor eliminates the need for
delivery required by gift theory. In re Estate of Copeland, 74 Ohio App. 164, 58 N.E.2d
64 (1943). The third party beneficiary theory was explicitly recognized in Lambert v.
Lambert, 95 Ohio App. 187, 118 N.E.2d 545 (1953). See 12 Am. Jur. "Contracts" § 274
(1958) which discusses the majority rule permitting a third party beneficiary to enforce
the contract even though he is a stranger both to the contract and to the consideration.
Ohio is in accord. Visintine & Co. v. New York, C. & S. L. R.R., 169 Ohio St. 505, 160
N.E.2d 311 (1959); 11 Ohio Jur. 2d "Contracts" § 176 (1955). See also infra note 40.
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(a) A life insurer agrees to make payment according to stated
terms to designated beneficiaries26 after the death of the insured.
2 7
(b) A bank28 or building and loan association29 contracts
to pay out a deposit account to a survivor beneficiary plainly desig-
nated by the depositor as a successor30 even though to do so plainly
offends public conscience.31
(c) The federal government promises to apply its own pub-
lished standards32 to determine outside of probate rules the party
entitled to collect the post-mortem proceeds of government bonds.
33
(d) An employer as a part of his duties to his employee by
contract undertakes to disburse death benefits to the employees
designated beneficiary. 34
26 By Ohio statute the designated beneficiary in a life insurance contract cannot re-
cover if murder was involved. See infra note 31.
27 Keldey v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N.E. 299 (1912); 30 Ohio
Jur. 2d "Insurance" § 5 (1958).
28 Berberick v. Courtade, 137 Ohio St. 297, 28 N.E.2d 636 (1940); 7 Ohio Jur. 2d
"Banks" § 121 (1954). For a good summary of the cases, see In re Schroeder, 75 Ohio
L. Abs. 555, 144 N.E.2d 512 (P. Ct. 1957).
29 8 Ohio Jur. 2d "Building & Loan Associations" § 31 (1954) ; the result is strongly
influenced by Ohio Rev. Code § 1151.19 (1953).
30 The effectiveness of survivorship designations turns on the presence of convincing
evidence of intent. 7 Ohio Jur. 2d "Banks" § 122 (1954); Keyt v. Mitchell, 106 Ohio
App. 149, 153 N.E.2d 690 (1957); Bauman v. NValtet, 160 Ohio St. 273, 116 N.E.2d 435
(1953).
31 A series of cases reinforce one infamous precedent in Ohio which permitted a
murderer to take property held in a joint bank account where he was the survivor
beneficiary. Had the asset been probate property, this result would have been forbidden
by Ohio Rev. Code § 2105.19 (1953). Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E.
833 (1935). Far from being concerned with the conscience of the survivor, the Ohio
Supreme Court held for the murderer based upon the vested interest notion. It was
admittedly unhappy with its own result, but contended itself with the comment
that it sat as "a court of law and not a theological institution." The case has been
soundly criticized; Vanneman, "The Constructive Trust: A Neglected Remedy in Ohio,"
3 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1936); 10 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 366 (1938). See also note, 27 U. Cinc. L.
Rev. 135 (1958); Note, 16 Ohio St. L.J. 117 (1955); and Note, 15 Ohio St. LJ. 235
(1954). Happily this result does not follow as to insurance proceeds. Neff v. Massachu-
setts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 158 Ohio St. 45, 107 N.E.2d 100 (1952).
32 Federal regulations provide that where two or more names are listed as co-
owners, the value passes to the survivors at the death of one. By regulation, no ex-
plicit language of survivorship is necessary. 31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1959), based on 31
U.S.C. § 757c (1958).
33 The Treasury regulations become a part of the contract. In re Estate of DiSanto,
142 Ohio St. 223, 51 N.E.2d 639 (1943).
34 Death benefit contracts payable by employers by reason of the death of the
employee have become sufficiently common as to have their own explicit method of
taxation. As to estate taxes, see an excellent article by Kramer, "Employee Benefits and
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes," 3 Tax Counselors Quarterly 49 (1959). See also Bilder,
"Death Benefits Paid Under An Express Contract," 34 Taxes 529 (1956). As to income
taxes where there is a binding agreement, consider § 101(6)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, along with Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
1961]
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(e) An Ohio corporation, under the authority of a statute,
recognizes properly designated survivorship succession to property
rights in its own shares.35
(f) A trustee assumes an enforceable contractual duty to his
cestui based on the obligations spelled out in a trust instrument. 30
(g) Title to real estate passes to a survivor under the terms
of a conveyance. This device looks like the ancient English joint
estate in real property37 which, as a rule of law, did not survive
the ocean voyage and the transit of the Appalachian wilderness to
Ohio.8 8 The same effect has been reached as a result of the intent
of the parties.39 (Contrast this with the examples which are based
on a contract by a third person liable to perform a post-mortem
duty. Where in this real estate survivorship arrangement is the third
person obligor characteristic to this type of relationship?) 40
2036, 58-2 U.S.T.C. f[ 9923 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 944 (1959). For income
tax implications of voluntary payments in the absence of an enforceable obligation, see
Death & Taxes II at 355, and Richards, "Voluntary Payments to Widows or Beneficiaries
of Deceased Employees," 22 Ohio St. L.J. 318 (1961).
35 The Ohio Corporation Code explicitly confers on a corporation the right to
permit a shareholder to create as to its shares ". .. a joint estate with the incidents of
a joint estate as at common law including the right of survivorship . . ." without the
necessity of explicit language of survivorship. Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.24 (1953).
36 54 Am. Jur. "Trusts" §§ 15, 63 (1958); Hill v. Irons, 160 Ohio St. 21, 113
N.E.2d 243 (1953).
37 "The 'grand incident of joint estate is the doctrine of survivorship "by which,
when two or more persons are seized of a joint estate, . ..the entire tenancy upon the
decease of any of them remains to the survivors, and at length to the last survivor; and
he shall be entitled to the whole estate, whatever it may be" '" citing Freeman, Cotenancy
& Partition, § 12 (2d ed. 1886). See opinion by Mr. Justice Black in United States v.
Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R. 282 (1939).
38 Farmers & Merchants National Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio St. 152, 12 N.E. 439
(1887), based upon Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305 (1827).
39 Cleaver v. Long, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 488, 126 N.E.2d 479 (C.P. 1955); Barsch,
"Survivorship Deeds," 22 Ohio Bar (No. 13) (1949); Kinney, "Conveyancing in Ohio"
(1955), pamphlet privately published in Cleveland, Ohio; Martin, "The Incident of
Survivorship in Ohio," 3 Ohio St. L.J. 48 (1936); Owen, "Survivorship Deeds in Ohio,"
3 W. Res. L. Rev. 60 (1951); White, "Notes on Survivorship Deeds-So-Called," 24
Ohio Op. 119 (1942); Zangerie, "Joint & Survivorship Property-Husband and Wife,"
24 Ohio Bar (No. 28) 441 (1951); Ohio State Bar Association, "Standards of Title
Examination," ff 3.4, (1955). Generally, as to tax implications, see Alexander, "Joint and
Survivorship Property," 20 Ohio St. L.J. 75 (1959).
40 The dissenting opinion of Judge Turner in Rhorbacker v. Citizens Bldg. Ass'n,
138 Ohio St. 273, 34 N.E.2d 751 (1941), pointed out that the early Ohio contract theory
cases depended upon the presence of some type of contractual undertaking between the
decedent and the survivor. For the first time in Ohio, the Rhorbacker case explicitly
turned upon the bank's contract with the depositor with no direct relationship with the
survivor as such. For the majority, Judge Zimmerman expressly admitted this new
development and analogized the Ohio joint and survivorship doctrine to the third party
beneficiary rule. Id. at 276, 34 N.E.2d at 253. A court of appeals expressly refused to
apply the third party theory where money in kind was kept intact until death in the
decedents constructive possession in his safe deposit box. The court held that the
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These are convincing enumerations of the broad power of an
owner by lifetime arrangements with third persons to provide for
varying results in succession. The contrast is overwhelming: the
familiar ancient probate obligation of conscience4' imposed upon the
decedent's estate to pay debts is protected in only a few limited
situations. No longer do courts feel called upon to murmur requiescat
in pace over the soul of the decedent. To apply the ancient hypothesis,
his spirit can be saved under modern law in the presence of unsatisfied
debts only if his property can somehow be made subject to probate
jurisdiction.
There are some situations where inter vivos arrangements have
not been effective to shut off the rights of creditors in favor of named
non-probate successors. These results apparently follow from the
beneficiary contract theory could be applied only where there was a debtor-creditor
relationship by which title had passed to the bank and where the depositor had obligated
the bank to disburse after death for the benefit of the third party. In re Estate of Cope-
land, 74 Ohio App. 164, 58 N.E.2d 64 (1943). That the property was still in the
possession of the decedent indicated a failure to accomplish delivery of the property with
sufficient definiteness to satisfy the legal element needed to effect a gift. There was no
debt element from another party on the basis of which the beneficiary was entitled to
the benefit of protection under the contract theory. See also supra note 25.
41 The modem American Catholic conscience is explicitly held to a moral obliga-
tion "as a group to give a high example of integrity in this matter of sharing the tax
burden ....
In our modem society, it has become quite general for wage-earners to pay income
taxes and we would do well at this time of year to examine the moral aspects of this
problem.
There have been a few Catholic moralists who held the view that the evasion of
income taxes concerned only a penal law and hence was not a matter of conscience. But
these opinions were based on the prevailing practices of a different society. In certain
countries the whole economy is based on 'haggling.' Goods are bought and goods are
sold, not on a firm, fixed price, but rather on 'the haggling wit' of buyer and seller.
Taxes in such countries are collected in pretty much the same way and the final
amount is the result of anticipated 'haggling.' Under such a system only a fool declares
his total income and the government is satisfied to settle at 'a reasonable figure.'
In our day and age, taxes are imposed and collected on rather strict accounting
principles. True, there are inequities in our tax structure . . . .We are never permitted
to lie and cheat ....
We must concede that] this 'average honesty' or 'rule of thumb honesty' [exists].
We are not implying that this sort of thing is an adequate norm of honesty in our
personal lives, but it seems to be an accepted norm in this area of tax payments, deduc-
tions, etc. ...
In the meantime as we near that inevitable time of the year, about all we can do
is pay and pay patriotically."
I have extracted extensive quotations passim from the Sunday bulletin for March 19,
1961 issued by Saint Andrews Catholic Church of Columbus "published with ecclesiastical
approbation" by J. G. O'Brien Co., Peoria, Illinois. Appreciation is extended to Mrs.
Angelina Tose of our staff for discovering this material.
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decedent's failure to sufficiently purge himself of all incidents of his
property rights. Where the strings retained argue against the com-
pleteness of the owner's gift,42 in some situations, the widow may
enforce her marital rights after death,43 but creditors do not share
this post-mortem authority.44 Perhaps like the spendthrift provisions
in the trust field,45 the obligor's specific duties to disburse only to
named successors seem to be limited to explicit definitions recited in
the contractual undertaking; 46 and there seems to be little obligation
on a non-probate obligor to consider the claims of general creditors47
excepting possibly the decedents liability for federal taxes.48
42 Common law principles have long recognized some flexibility in the right of an
owner to alienate his property even though to do so would tend to deprive his creditors
of means out of which to satisfy their claims. 25 Ohio Jur. 2d "Fraudulent Conveyances"
§ 26 passirn (1957). This right has been cut down by the statute of frauds forbidding
conveyances in fraud of creditors. Ohio Rev. Code § 1335.02 (1953). Since a general
conveyance to outsiders could be cancelled in a proceeding in equity, it is hardly surprising
to find that a statute holds that a revocable trust conveyance can be cancelled in equity
for the same reason. Ohio Rev. Code § 1335.01 (1953).
43 Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E.2d 378 (1947); see cases from other
states collected by Casner, Estate Planning 82 (2d ed. 1956).
44 A creditor cannot invoke the power of revocation in an inter vivos trust after
death notwithstanding the provisions of Ohio Rev. Code § 1335.01 (1953). Since the
grantor died without revoking, his creditors cannot invoke the statute which applies
only during the lifetime of the grantor. Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St.
328, 21 N.E.2d 119 (1939); Goldman, Rights of the Spouse and the Creditor in Inter
Vivos Trusts, 17 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 1 (1948).
45 54 Am. Jur. "Trusts" § 152 (1958).
46 Consider the argument by an insurer that the government could not attach life
insurance proceeds for the satisfaction of unpaid income tax liabilities because it could
not be relieved of its contractual obligation to the insured under automatic premium
loan provisions in the policies. The point was rejected in United States v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 17, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1958).
47 For some time the federal estate tax partially ignored claims against non-probate
property; this variety of administration expenses formerly could not be deducted in
determining the taxable estate because the statute permitted deduction only for probate
administration costs. See Comm'r v. Davis, 132 F.2d 644, 30 Am. Fed. Tax R. 647, 43-1
U.S.T.C. ff 9239 (1st Cir. 1943); compare with Sharpe's Estate v. Comm'r, 148 F.2d 179,
33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 906, 45-1 U.S.T.C. ff 10,185 (3d Cir. 1945); see also Haggart v.
Comm'r, 182 F.2d 514, 39 Am. Fed. Tax R. 537, 50-1 U.S.T.C. 71 10,772 (3d Cir. 1950).
To grant the deduction, since 1954 the non-probate expenditures are now recognized
under § 2053(b) of the Internal Revenue Code if they were paid within a stated limita-
tion period. The federal statute has been specially recast to deal with the distinction so
as to allow the deductions which originate outside the probate estate.
The same distinction inheres in the Ohio inheritance tax statute. Deductions still
unused after exhausting the probate estate cannot be carried across so as to reduce the
non-probate succession. In effect, the deductions unused against the probate property do
not apply at all for inheritance tax relief. In re Estate of Chadwick, 167 Ohio St. 272
(1958).
48 Under federal law, any fiduciary or other person who distributes assets without
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Frequently a given asset will not satisfactorily stay put within
these neat categories of definition. Real estate can be treated as non-
probate property by a lifetime contract49 or as a probate asset where
the decedent so provides by his will" or where state law requires it,51
or perhaps where state law permits it to be pulled into the estate for
convenience in administration.52  Furthermore, the lifetime arrange-
ment may not work; it might fail for want of proof of intente3 or
because of the failure of the named beneficiary. In these situations,
the property will revert back to the probate estate for administration
and distribution."'
Given the influence of state law in ascertaining the taxable per-
son for federal income tax purposes, it is inescapable that these inter-
complicated property doctrines materially influence the federal tax
law and its techniques. The flexibility of the property doctrines have
generated equally effective federal estate and income tax doctrines to
reach at death the variegated interests which have in common at
least the factor of economic value. The precise legal nomenclature,
classification and terminology are largely irrelevant; the estate and
income tax bite equally into all three major devolutiofi categories.
See table 2 infra.
Without regard to the refinements of legal doctrine55 for federal
satisfying the federal tax claims against the person or estate becomes personally liable
for having done so. 48 Stat. 760, 31 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192 (1958). Generally see, Green-
baum, "Tax Responsibilities of the Executor, the Administrator & the Trustee," 2 Estate
Tax Techniques 2003 (1960); Alexander, "Personal Liability of Executors and Trustees
for Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxes," 9 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1953); Dewey, "Hidden
Liabilities of Fiduciaries," 99 Trust & Estates 312 (April, 1960). This aspect has
tremendous scope in a swiftly developing field of law. Even part of this may depend
upon state law. Consider United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1904, 58-2
U.S.T.C. f[ 9595 (1958) and Comm'r v. Stem, 357 U.S. 39, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1899,
58-2 U.S.T.C. IT 9594 (1958). The Ohio Probate Code has a comprehensive arrangement
to insure the payment of the debts of a decedent. Ohio Rev. Code § 2117.06 (1953).
40 See supra note 39.
60 Ohio Rev. Code § 2113.39 (1953) authorizes direct sale by the executor without
judicial intervention when authority has been conferred by the will.
51 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2127.01 and 2127.02 (1953) authorizes judicial sale when
necessary to pay debts.
52 Ohio Rev. Code § 2113.311 (1958) allows a probte court to grant authority in
limited cases to an executor or administrator to take charge of and manage real estate
of the decedent to the exclusion of the heirs.
53 See the intent problem discussed at supra note 30.
54 Ryan v. Rothweiler, 50 Ohio St. 595, 35 N.E. 679 (1893) held that life insurance
proceeds which provided for non-probate succession must be paid to the estate adminis-
trator on failure of beneficiaries named in the policy.
55 The broad rule of inclusion spelled out in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§ 2033 taxes the value of all property to the extent of the interest of the decedent at
the time of his death, excepting only foreign real estate.
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estate tax purposes, retained interests5 6 in the decedent are not sev-
ered from continuing control sufficiently to escape taxability if there
be remnant authority in the decedent by power of revocation,5 7 or by
reserved control over income, 5 8 or by continuing authority to desig-
nate the path of devolution59 or by diversionary administrative con-
trol.6" Too long in delaying to effectively terminate these controls
will produce the same result. 1 Automatic devolution by conventional
joint property ownership arrangements is easily includible.62  Simi-
larly, lifetime contractual arrangements in the form of annuities with
survivorship features, 63 insurance on the life of the owner64 or on
the life of another controlled by the decedent,65 and benefits payable
by reason of death,66 are all includible. For the most part, these
lifetime contracts usually carry their own built-in devolution provi-
sions explicitly designed to operate outside of probate succession
patterns. All of these refinements come to the same end: they are all
includible for federal estate tax purposes quite apart from the nar-
row scope of definition under probate law,67 without regard to who
may be the ultimate beneficiary. The few loopholes in estate tax includ-
56 The key to estate taxability of many fractured interests is the essential element
that the principal property must have been the general property of the decedent in such
form that it would have been includible in his estate. Having once held the powers of
ownership, when it is comminuted by the almost illimitable refinements of conveyancing,
a retained control over income benefit, devolution or administrative diversion (see. infra
notes 58 and 60) are the remnant of earlier ownership. They are really strings. See the
discussion by judge Weinman in Rundle v. Welch, 184 F. Supp. 777, 5 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 1916 (S.D. Ohio 1960) and cases cited; Comm'r v. Chase Nat'l Bank of New
York, 82 F.2d 157, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R. 576, 36-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9154 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 552 (1936); and discussion by Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate & Gift
Taxes 247 (1956); Foosaner, "Transfers Intended to Take Effect at Death," 1 Estate
Tax Techniques 1201 (1955), especially at 1222 with history and authorities.
57 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2038.
58 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2036(a); Covey, "Section 2036-The New Problem
Child of the Federal Estate Tax," 4 Tax Counselors Quarterly 121 (1960); Gray and
Covey, "State Street-A Case Study of Sections 2036(a) (2) and 2038," 15 Tax L. Rev.
75 (1959).
59 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2037, 2038 and 2041.
60 State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d
1764, 59-1 U.S.T.C. ff 11,849 (1st Cir. 1959); see also Covey, supra note 58, at 140.
61 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035.
62 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2040.
63 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2039.
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2042.
65 Estate of R.C. duPont v. Comm'r, 233 F.2d 210, 49 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1203, 56-1
U.S.T.C. ff 11607 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956); Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 2033(a).
66 Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 56, at 295.
67 Present law broadly fixes the successors' basis at the fair market value at which
the property devolved. The result is the same whether it was subject to probate ad-
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ibility are not large,"' and the broad sweep of inclusions seems to be
reinforced by the enforcement standards of the courts."9
A broad statute and generally effective judicial attitudes have
produced broad definitions of inclusion for income tax purposes.70
The trichotomy of devolution devices shunts taxable income-broadly
defined-to a wide span of ultimate beneficiaries determined by these
complex patterns. From all of this it is obvious that as an intensely
practical matter, both estate and income taxation are brought to the
doorstep of many no matter what the refinements of legal title.71
The broad holes in the estate tax72 and income tax73 patterns seem to
be caused by factors other than the variegated and complicated
property and devolution system on which they have been super-
imposed. We turn then to examine how the devolution doctrines
operate as to the collection of the decedent's taxes and tax debts
under each method and to see the effect on each class of beneficiaries
after the taxes have been paid. Do the differences affect collection of
the taxes? After they have paid, whose inheritance is reduced?
COLLECTION OF THE DECEDENT'S FEDERAL TAXEs AND ALLOCATION
AMONG HIS SUCCEssORs OF THEIR ECONOMIC BURDEN
The right of ultimate collection of federal estate taxes out of a
decedent's property is not impeded by the trichotomy of devolution
ministration or whether it passed outside the probate succession. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 1014(b)(9). This rule does not apply where includible property was sold by the
successor during the lifetime of the decedent. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-1(a) (1957). The
rule before 1954 applied only to probate property; although includible for estate tax
purposes, the decedents fair market value did not necessarily apply to successions outside
the probate pattern. Spicer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 472, 52 Am. Fed. Tax R. 211
(Ct. Cl. 1950). Thus one disparity between the two taxes was eliminated but other
major areas remain.
68 The need for general reform of the estate tax system has been developed. Eisen-
stein, "The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax," 11 Tax L. Rev. 223 (1956); Dewind,
"The Approaching Crises in Federal Estate & Gift Taxation," 38 Calif. L. Rev. 79 (1950);
Surrey, "An Introduction to Revision of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes," 38 Calif. L.
Rev. 1 (1950).
69 The State Street case, supra note 60 is an example of a strict attitude on in-
cludibility.
70 Consider the line of cases of which Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 24 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 1058, 40-2 U.S.T.C. ff 9787 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331,
23 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1077, 40-1 U.S.T.C. fI 9265 (1940) and Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111,
8 Am. Fed. Tax R. 10287 (1930) are examples; Rice, "Judicial Trends in Gratuitous
Assignments To Avoid Federal Income Tax," 64 Yale L.J. 991 (1955).
71 Justices Peckham, McReynolds, Sutherland, Black cited supra note 1.
72 See supra note 68.
73 That there are many serious problems in untaxed income has been the discovery
of the Mills Committee in its 1959 hearing on broadening the tax base. See compendium
volumes 1, 2 and 3 for chapter and verse.
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patterns. Federal statutes hold each of the assets in a taxable suc-
cession subject to an in rem liability for the payment of all of the
estate taxes. 74 It is not material to the executor's obligation to make
full payment whether the property is in the hands of the fiduciary 5
or whether it has been transferred to beneficiaries70  including the
donee of a gift."" Various methods to allocate the burden of the
estate taxes do not reduce the right of the government as creditor
to require payment out of any of the assets of all three classes no
matter by whom the payment is made or where the liability falls.71
Income taxes are different. The pervasive sweep of estate tax
liability imposed on each item of property at the passing of the
taxable estate should be distinguished from the government's right
to effect collection of a decedent's ante-mortem income tax liabilities
out of the assets devolving to the successors. These are priority
debts of the decedent 9 as to which an executor makes at his own
peril a transfer of probate property to heirs 0 or creditors.3 ' Work-a-
day court procedure protects the government's tax claims82 and the
74 The estate tax is a lien for 10 years upon all the assets of the gross estate of the
decedent except such parts as are used for the payment of charges against the estate
and for costs of administration. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6324(a) (1).
75 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2002; notice the broad inclusive definition of executor:
Ccany person in actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent"; Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 2203; see also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a) (6).
76 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6324(a) (2) enumerates non-probate beneficiaries who
are liable as transferees. Where several persons are held liable and where one pays more
than his proportionate share, he is entitled to contribution from the others. Phillips-Jones
Corp. v. Parmley, 302 U.S. 233, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1235, 37-2 U.S.T.C. [ 9573 (1937).
77 The donor of a gift is primarily liable; the donee holds the property subject to
an in rem lien for the unpaid federal gift tax on the transfer. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 6324(b). Query, what is the effect on the contribution rule of the gift tax credit for
the tax paid where the gift is included in the estate as having been made in con-
templation of death under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035?
78 Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1467, 2 U.S.T.C. ff 743
(1931); Foerster v. Foerster, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 129, 122 N.E.2d 314 (P. Ct. 1954).
79 Comm'r v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1899, 53-2 U.S.T.C. f1 9594
(1958).
80 Viles v. Comm'r, 233 F.2d 376, 49 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1217, 56-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9539
(6th Cir. 1956). Generally, see Alexander, "Personal Liabilities of Executors for Federal
Taxes," 9 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1953).
81 48 Stat. 760, 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1958). Notice that this liability turns on priority
payment of other debts of the decedent. It is recognized that a distribution to satisfy
the Ohio statutory exemption under Ohio Rev. Code § 2115.13 (1953) and the widows
allowance under Ohio Rev. Code § 2117.20 (1953) are not debts but quasi pre-existing
property claims. Carls Estate, 58 Ohio L. Abs. 3, 39 Am. Fed. Tax R. 908 (P. Ct. 1950).
The federal statutes set up federal priority but the Ohio Probate Code seems to effectively
modify the absolute federal priority. Ohio Rev. Code § 2117.25 (1953).
82 Franklin County, Ohio Probate Court Rule 5 requires the fiduciary to certify that
he knows of no outstanding claims as to which presentation is not required by statute.
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Ohio "bob-tail" probate limitation statute requiring presentment of
claims within four months83 cannot shorten the collection period. 4
Neither can state courts lend effective aid and comfort to the executor
by a discharge prior to payment of the decedents federal tax liabil-
ities, 85 nor by seizing assets from him to assist other creditors under
color of state judicial process.86
Collecting unpaid income taxes out of non-probate successions is
in a different category if the life insurance cases are instructive. In
a non-probate succession by a life insurance beneficiary, the right
of the federal government to collect a decedent's unpaid income taxes
out of the proceeds turns on whether a tax lien existed before death.
The effect of the ante-mortem lien after it has been assessed is de-
termined under federal statute no matter what the state law may be;
the life insurance transferee is held liable. This principle certainly
encourages the government to be an impatient creditor for the ab-
sence of the ante-mortem lien is crucial. Where no assessment has
been made, a federal statute8 has left to state law to determine
whether the spirit of the departed can bear the grievous remem-
brance of the unpaid income tax bills. Congress permits each state
to weigh as a matter of policy, whether the burden of the memory
of the unpaid federal income taxes on the soul of the debtor is too
intolerable to permit it to suffer.8 ' Some jurisdictions may still reach
the result which in effect follows the ecclesiastical objective to com-
fort the conscience of the decedent by forcing his successors to
satisfy the claims of the public purse9" out of the life insurance
83 Ohio Rev. Code § 2117.06 (1953).
84 United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940).
85 Viles v. Comm'r, supra note 80.
86 Compare Northwestern Jobbers Credit Bureau, 1 T.C. 863 (1943) with G. P.
Fitzgerald, 4 T.C. 494 (1944).
87 United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1904, 58-2 U.S.T.C.
ff 9595 (1958) applying Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321; see also Barton, "What the
Supreme Court Said About Stern and Bess," 37 Taxes 9 (1959); Grayck, "The Liability
of a Life Insurance Beneficiary for the Insured Income Taxes: A Postscript to the Supreme
Court's Decision in the Stern and Bess Cases," 14 Tax L. Rev. 137 (1958); Heron,
"Federal Tax Claims Again or Devastation Revisited," 26 Ins. Counsel J. 112 (1959).
88 The transferee liability statute does not create any new substantive liability but
merely provides a new procedure by which the government can collect its taxes. Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 6901; Conm'r v. Stern, supra note 79.
89 This sentence paraphrases the American Episcopalian General Confession which
acknowledges "manifold sins and wickedness." At communion, these latter day descend-
ants of the ancient English churchgoers "earnestly repent, and are heartily sorry for
these our misdoings; The remembrance of them is grievous unto us; The burden of
them is intolerable . . . ." The Book of Common Prayer at 75, Protestant Episcopal
Church in America, New York, 1945.
00 Walfer & Cahn, "The United States as a Creditor for Taxes," 35 Taxes 604
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proceeds. Ohio careth not 9 for the post-mortem repose of the con-
sciences of her citizenry: it has declared that life insurance proceeds
are not subject to seizure 2 and the federal courts will not enforce
payment of government claims for unpaid income taxes against
insurance proceeds" except where it is paid to an estate.94 This local
law doctrine may apply to most non-probate assets; it will vary from
state to state and from one type of asset to another. This variable
state-to-state approach as to income tax liabilities should be contrasted
with the rigorous rule which inexorably requires payment of all estate
taxes out of any assets, probate or non-probate, including insurance
proceeds.95
After the executor has satisfied the money demands of the govern-
ment, the question arises as to who effectively pays the estate tax bill
through the reduction of their respective shares resulting from the dis-
tribution settlement? Proportionate allocation among various bene-
ficiaries would seem to be a sound method; indeed this is close to the
theory of the Ohio inheritance tax which reduces the share of each
beneficiary by the amount of taxes assessed against each respective
succession. 6 Since the federal estate tax falls on property passing
according to state law by all three methods of devolution, it seems
fair that each beneficiary should pay an allocated proportion. This
(1957); and for a definitive exposition generally, see Plumb, "Federal Tax, Collection
and Lien Problems," 13 Tax L. Rev. 247 (1958) and Walson, "Federal Tax Liens-A
Study in Confusion and Confiscation," 43 Marq. L. Rev. 180 (1959). See also Reiling,
"Priority of Federal Tax Liens," 36 Taxes 978 (1958).
91 The frequent references here to the ancient church and the effect its teachings
have had upon the modern law of devolution suggest the use of archaic language
commonly employed in its observances. Veblen has particularly discoursed on the
general subject, The Theory of the Leisure Class, chapter 12 passim, "Devout Obser-
vances" (1899).
92 Ohio Rev. Code § 3911.10 (1955) as to life insurance proceeds payable to the
widow, children and named creditors. The right to change the beneficiary makes no
difference. Baxter v. Old National-City Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189 N.E. 514 (1933).
As to a similar exemption from attachment of proceeds of group life insurance, see
Ohio Rev. Code § 3917.05 (1953). See Note, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 361 (1959).
93 Compare Bess & Stern, with Bowlin v. Comm'r, 273 F.2d 610, 5 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 389, 60-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9172 (6th Cir. 1960) (conveyance of property including in-
surance otherwise exempt was found to be fraudulent under Tennessee law, therefore
proceeds held liable for federal income taxes).
94 The exemption statute expressly applies only to proceeds payable to certain
categories of beneficiaries of which the estate is not one. See also Kieferdorf v. Comm'r,
142 F.2d 723, 32 Am. Fed. Tax R. 728, 44-1 U.S.T.C. f1 9323 (9th Cir. 1944), which
appears to be applicable even though Stern & Bess have intervened.
95 See text at supra notes 74-78.
96 "A tax is hereby levied upon the succession to any property passing, in trust or




logical result is too simple and the legal history is too confused to reach
such a neat solution.
As a basic premise, the Supreme Court has told us that Congress
intended that the ordinary estate tax liability falls on successors
according to the state law of administration and succession." What-
ever the applicable state law may be, the Tax Court need not decide
state law as to the allocation of the burden of the federal estate tax
in deficiency proceedings 8 Of course, just like most other testate
successions, 9 the testator can control the incidence of the federal
tax burden by explicit provisions in the terms of his will.' In the
absence of testate direction, the allocation answers turn in part on the
distinction between probate property and non-probate succession:
1. By federal statute, where an excessive amount of the estate
tax liability has been paid by a non-probate beneficiary or
collected out of non-probate property, the beneficiary is en-
titled to recover from the estate the amount by which his pay-
ments exceed an equitable proportion.1 1 By a cognate federal
statute, the same result is reached as to life insurance proceeds 02
97 Riggs v. De]Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1205, 40-2 U.S.T.C. 1 10,219
(1942).
98 Tarver's Estate v. Comm'r, 255 F.2d 913, 1 Am.. Fed. Tax R.2d 2174, 58-2
U.S.T.C. ff 11,805 (4th Cir. 1958).
99 American law permits the broadest sweep to the freedom of testacy known in
the western world. See generally Atkinson, "Succession Among Collaterals," 20 Iowa
L. Rev. 185 (1935); Kennedy, "Testator's Dependents Relief Legislation," 20 Iowa L.
Rev. 317 (1935); Lanfer, "Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-a Report on
Decedents Family Maintenance Legislation," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 277 (1955); Touster,
"Testamentary Freedom and Social Control-After Born Children," 6 Buffalo L. Rev.
251 (1957). See also Cahn, "Federal Regulation of Inheritance," 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 297
(1940); Cavers, "Change in the American Family and the Laughing Heir," 20 Iowa L.
Rev. 202 (1935); Headley, "Inheritance-a Basic Personal Freedom," 88 Trusts &
Estates 24 (1949); Magill, "Federal Regulation of Family Settlements," 4 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 265 (1937); Simes, "Protecting the Surviving Spouse by Restraints on the Dead
Hand," 26 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 1 (1957); Sayre, "Recent Ideologies in the Law of Succession
to Property," 32 Ill. L. Rev. 690, 699 (1938). Is there a policy implication in the kind
of situation which resulted in the decision of the Supreme Court in In re Estate of
Kelly, 165 Ohio St. 259, 135 N.E.2d 378 (1956)? Virtually the only widespread effective
limitations on testacy are the provisions which insure-out of probate property only-
a fractional share for the surviving spouse. Compare Ohio Rev. Code § 2103.02 (1953).
Recently, English statutes have imposed limitations on the right to pass property to those
outside the family circle where they do not come within family obligations.
100 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2205, 2206, 2207; United States v. Goodson, 253
F.2d 900g, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 2133 (8th Cir. 1958); In re Estate of Gatch, 153 Ohio
St. 401, 92 N.E.2d 404 (1950); YMCA v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E.2d 114
(1922), aff'd, 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
101 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2205.
102 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2206.
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by a reverse method of statement; and the recipient of property
over which the decedent had a power of appointment by statute
is similarly liable to the executor of the estate to make an
equitable contribution out of his succession.10 3
2. Supplementing the federal law, Ohio requires equitable con-
tribution between the beneficiaries of non-probate property and
the probate estate considered as a unit. Thus a beneficiary
under an inter vivos revocable trust not subject to probate
administration has been held to a duty to contribute propor-
tionately'0 4 to the payment of federal estate taxes.10 5 Required
contribution' 6 would seem to apply proportionately between the
probate estate as an entity and all species of non-probate
assets'07 within the major categories of devolution following a
method of allocated proportionate contribution.0 This rule is
so strong that Ohio has recognized that the general testamentary
direction to pay debts and taxes of the decedent found in many
wills is not sufficiently indicative of testative intention to pay
from the probate estate the death taxes generated by non-
probate property.10 9
3. Within the probate estate, the allocation is quite different.
Ancient probate doctrines re-emerge in the absence of explicit
103 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2207.
104 MacDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d
441 (1952); see also In re Estate of Gatch, supra note 100 as to life insurance; see
Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 169 (1954).
105 Foerster v. Foerster, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 129, 122 N.E.2d 314 (P. Ct. 1954)
exonerated non-probate assets from contribution where a concomitant marital deduction
produced no estate tax liability.
106 Generally on this pervasive and immediate problem, see Lauritzen, "Apportion-
ment of Federal Estate Tax," 1 Tax Counsellor's Quarterly 55 (1957); Note, Wash.
Univ. L. Q. 89 (1955); Sutter, "How to Plan for Apportionment of Estate Taxes," 2
Estate Tax Techniques 2137 (1955) ; and Stickney, "Who Pays the Federal Estate Tax?,"
18 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 1 (1949). See also Brofman, "The Burden of Federal Estate Taxes,"
29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 498 (1957).
107 Central Trust Co. v. Lamb, 74 Ohio App. 299, 58 N.E.2d 785 (1944); In re
Estate of Jennings, 28 Ohio Op. 66, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 313 (P. Ct. 1944). See Annot., 15
A.L.R.2d 1216 (1951).
108 Query in what court by what procedure can contribution be enforced against
the inter vivos trust? New York statute has recently conferred authority on the sur-
rogates court. See In re Estate of Colosimo, 104 Ohio App. 342, 149 N.E.2d 31 (Ct.
App. 1957). As to one application of the rule requiring proportionate contribution, see
Phillips Jones Corp. v. Parmley, supra note 76 which enforced equitable contribution
between transferees.
109 In re Estate of Gatch, supra note 100.
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testamentary direction: following ordinary probate distribution
priorities," personal property is first called on to settle all
debts, federal government tax claims as well, even to the extent
of requiring no contribution from real estate."' After determin-
ing the respective interests of probate beneficiaries in the types
of property they receive net after payment of taxes, the fraction
each beneficiary gets is charged with the taxes allocable to each
respective share if it be determined according to the statute of
descent and distribution. Thus when the widow's share is fixed
by intestacy" 2 or by election,113 or where a succession passes to
charity," 4 neither gets the direct benefit of the entire marital and
charitable deductions. The shares of all beneficiaries benefit from
the deduction without recourse to the tax computation; the dis-
tribution is determined by reference to whether he gets person-
alty by specific legacy in the will, or whether it descends under the
general residue clause, or whether it passes by intestacy under
the statute of descent.
The notions underlying contribution are strong and persuasive;
their origins lie in ancient doctrines of equity. The strong aversion
to hold real estate for the payment of debts of a decedent follows
an even longer current of legal history, the reasons for which have
disappeared. Even so, the established preference for general real
estate over personalty has a slightly functional basis quite apart from
its roots in the feudal system: personalty is usually easier to liqui-
date. Is this enough to continue to justify the preference of one
class of successors against another?
110 Generally, see Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 553 (1960) and Ohio Rev. Code § 2107.53
(1953).
111 Compare Ginder v. Ginder, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 277 (P. Ct. 1954). For an unre-
ported case in accord with the Ginder rule, see In re Estate of Ada M. Clay, Ohio Ct.
App. (Seneca County) No. 355 (1959), 4 Danaher, "Developments In Ohio Probate and
Inheritance Tax Law" 44 (1960).
112 Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 911
(1954) overruling Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952) held that
the widows share is proportionately reduced by the proportionate share of the estate
taxes even though a part of the benefit of her marital deduction reduced the total
estate tax liability. The decision was followed in Estate of Rose G. Jaeger, 27 T.C. 863
(1957), aff'd per curiam, 252 F.2d 790, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 2115, 58-1 U.S.T.C.
ff 11,750 (6th Cir. 1958).
113 Consider as an example MacDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 157
Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
114 Similarly to the Campbell case, supra note 112, applied to a charitable deduction,
see Hall v. Ball, 162 Ohio St. 299, 123 N.E.2d 259 (1954).
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CONCLUSION
"A page of history is worth a volume of logic.""' The mailed
fists of the English military authorities of the Norman feudal period
still reach into the daily practice of American lawyers. The spiritual
notions of medieval churchmen still hover near the consciences of
contemporary decedents. Over these have appeared newer varieties
of succession techniques which have jumped across these pages of
history and intruded upon volumes of modern logic based on ancient
third party beneficiary doctrine in the law of contracts. Superim-
posed on these have grown the implications and complications of
the American federal system of divided governmental authority and
mixed sources for rules of decision." 6 The present law of federal
tax impositions and collections out of successions is drawn from many
other pages of history and numerous volumes of logic. History
testifies as a witness and shouts as an advocate that indeed, tax law
is not a separate watertight compartment.
Modern probate law has grown into increasing complexity while
the push of economic inflation has brought an increasing number of
estates and incomes into the reach of the federal tax gatherers. The
probate practitioner cannot dismiss this history by disclaiming his
competence in the tax law. Thus one obvious practical fact to prove
this point is the necessity that the burden of the tax debt must be
reckoned with algebraically 17 in order to competently perform the
115 Mr. Justice Holmes in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349, 3 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 3110, 1 U.S.T.C. f[ 49 (1921).
116 The federal taxing statute is plenary and controlling in its own sphere as an
incident of the taxing power of the federal government; Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103,
11 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1085, 3 U.S.T.C. f 990 (1932). Federal tax law has partially im-
ported state law to suit its own purposes. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 21 Am. Fed.
Tax R. 986, 38-2 U.S.T.C. f1 9602 (1938) and Stern v. Comm'r, supra note 79; "The
Role of State Law in Federal Tax Determinations," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1350 (1959). But
in all these areas, federal law remains supreme; it has only borrowed the state law.
The federal standard can easily abandon the state law results any time it decides to do
so. Compare the history of estate taxation which started with Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S.
101, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R. 576, 2 U.S.T;C. ff 611 (1930) and culminated in the changes in
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2056.
Contrast the applicability of state law in diversity litigation in the federal courts.
Justice Brandeis pointed out that state law was the only possible source to determine
the rules of substantive decision; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Thus
stated the only job of the federal court in a diversity case is to discover and apply state
law even if it has to be deduced from precedents which originated in lower echelon
state courts. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); in the federal field,
compare Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1209, 42-2 U.S.T.C.
ff 9750 (1942) and Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 47 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1230, 55-1
U.S.T.C. 11 9485 (3d Cir. 1955).
117 In the absence of overqualification for the marital deduction or a formula clause,
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distributive function. Taxation is an eminently practical part of the
general fabric of the law. Not to understand this fundamental, dis-
plays technical incompetence and betrays professional responsibility.
the amount of federal estate tax depends upon the amount of property which actually
passes to the widow under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 2056(a); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-4(c) (1958). Since the amount passing to the widow depends upon the
amount of the marital deduction which in turn affects the determination of the estate
tax, the result is two mutually interdependent unknowns. Their solution can get still
more complicated in the presence of similar interdependents based on a state death tax
credit and a variable charitable credit. They can be solved by simultaneous algebraic
equations, or by a series of estimates. These methods appear at Powers, "How to Solve
Mathematical Problems of Husband-Wife Estate Planning," 1 Estate Tax Techniques
3. The Internal Revenue Service has devised some useful variations. See Supple-
mental Instructions for Computation of Interrelated Death Taxes and Marital Deduc-
tion for Form 706, Publication No. 210, Government Printing Office (1955).
